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a b s t r a c t
We develop an aspiration-based dynamic model which leads to enhanced cooperation in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game played by the continuous population of agents. The main
idea is to limit the aggregate information available to the agents. The model – a system
of three nonlinear differential equations – describes the evolution of the aspiration levels
of players who use different strategies, and the evolution of the mean frequency of the
cooperative strategy in the system of players. The stationary (partial) cooperation level is
calculated explicitly. We demonstrate that, contrary to the similar model with only one
global aspiration level, the stationary cooperation level can be greater than half.
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Evolution of cooperation is one of the most important social phenomena studied extensively in social, economical and
biological sciences. In many scientific disciplines, which investigate systems with microscopic interactions, the theoretical
description is based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. It has been studied formany years as a paradigm for the evolution
of cooperation, cf. [1–9], and the literature cited therein.
In general, in the case of continuous populations of agents playing the 2-person PD without any additional mechanisms
whichwouldmodify the behavior of the players it is expected that the only stable outcome of the evolution is total defection.
Various learning procedures have been proposed to overcome the dilemma. In order to make a learning procedure
effective, the interacting individuals can be attributed additional features,which are updated according to their performance,
cf. e.g. [10–12], and the references cited therein. Over the past decades the theory of adaptive agents expanded as an
important branch of the theory of complex systems.
An important role is played in this respect by aspirations of the interacting individuals. In particular, in [12] the authors
study a model of adaptive agents, based on the Bush–Mosteller model, in which there is a feedback between the change of
behavior (strategy), and the habituation – adaptation of the players to stimuli. The model consists of a learning algorithm
with a time-dependent aspiration level, and a stochastic decision rule.
On the other hand one can consider the continuous dynamical system description of the PD, and solve the dilemma
by introducing the dynamically changing aspirations of the agents. In particular, in [13] an aspiration-based model of
cooperation in a continuous system of agents, matched at any instant of time to play a 2-person PD has been proposed
and thoroughly investigated. The aspiration level was assumed to be a global (the same for all the agents), time-dependent
variable, updated e.g. on the basis of the average payoff in the system. Together with a modified replicator-type equation
for the change of the frequency of cooperators, such evolutionary scenario resulted in a system of two ordinary differential
equations, the solution of which, under rather general conditions, converged to a limiting state with a positive fraction of
cooperators, however always lesser than half. We refer the reader to the above paper for details.
In this note we propose a modification of this approach, with the objective to increase the average percentage of the
cooperation in the system in the long run. The main idea originates from the general observation that in game theory, in
some cases the reduction of information available to the agents results in a better performance of the system as a whole.
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In particular, in the theory of correlated equilibria (cf. e.g. [14]) the randomization of the expectations of one ormore players
about the strategy choices of the opponents can result in a Nash equilibrium with higher payoffs for all the players. The
imperfect knowledge of the extent of inequity aversion [15] of the opponents can increase the cooperation levels, e.g. in the
public goods games, cf. [16]. A lack of knowledge of the error rates of the opponents (cf. [17]) can increase cooperation e.g. in
the trust games.
In this note we assume that cooperators and defectors have different time-dependent aspiration levels, and their evolu-
tion depends on the mean payoffs of the corresponding group. Thus, we change the information which the agents posses –
the cooperators (defectors) have only information about the mean payoff of the subpopulation of cooperators (defectors).
The resulting model is a system of three ordinary differential equations, with a particular structure which enables the
analytical investigation of the existence of the stationary states with a positive cooperation level greater than half. This
method also allows to demonstrate that the partially cooperative asymptotic stationary states are globally attractive for all
initial data from the interior of the phase space of the system. For comparisonwe also present results (for the samenumerical
values of the parameters of the model) of analogous calculations for the model with one global aspiration level, for which
the partial cooperation is always lesser than half. We conclude with a discussion of some open problems.
2. The model
The PD game is a one stage game in which two nondistinguishable players simultaneously and independently choose
one of the two actions: cooperate (C) or defect (D), and has the payoff matrix (with T > R > P > S)
C D
C R, R S, T
D T , S P, P
In [13] the authors proposed an evolutionary model, a continuous system of agents, matched pairwise at any instant of
time to play the PD game. All the agents had the same time-dependent aspiration level, and the temporal evolution of the
frequency of cooperators was governed by a mean field type equation. The resulting time asymptotic cooperation level was
always lesser than half.
We model the evolution of the system of agents similarly as in [13], however we assume that the cooperators and
defectors have different aspiration levels, and change their aspiration levels on the basis of the limited information available
to their group. In particular, if the payoff of the agent is lower than the aspiration level of its strategy, then the agent switches
her action at a rate depending on the difference between the payoff from the actual strategy and the current aspiration level.
The rate is defined by a nondecreasing, continuously differentiable on R+ switch function f (χ), which describes how the
agents react when dissatisfied.
In our model with the time-dependent aspiration levels, the evolution equation for the frequency of cooperators can be
written as a generalization of [13]:
µ˙ = −µ2f (αC − R)− µ(1− µ)f (αC − S)+ µ(1− µ)f (αD − T )+ (1− µ)2f (αD − P) = F(µ, αC , αD), (1)
where
f (χ)
{= 0, if χ ≤ 0
> 0, if χ > 0. (2)
The two nonpositive terms on the rhs describe the flow of the cooperators who, by comparing their payoff with the actual
aspiration level in the subpopulation of cooperators, switch to defect. The two nonnegative terms describe the flow of
defectors who switch to play cooperation, being dissatisfied with their payoffs from the interaction with respectively a
cooperator or another defector.
Ifµ is the proportion of cooperators in the system, the average payoffs of a randomly chosen player is defined respectively
for cooperators and defectors by
ΠC = µR+ (1− µ)S, ΠD = µT + (1− µ)P. (3)
The evolution of the aspiration functions of cooperators and defectors is assumed to be governed respectively by
α˙C = ΠC (µ)− αC . (4)
α˙D = ΠD(µ)− αD, (5)
reflecting the assumption that the knowledge of a player using a particular strategy about the mean payoffs in the system
is limited to the subpopulation which at the considered instant of time plays that strategy.
The system (1), (4) and (5) is a rather complicated three-dimensional systemwithin general nondifferentiable rhs. It has,
two ‘‘trivial’’ singular points:
(µ = 0, αC = S, αD = P), (µ = 1, αC = R, αD = T ). (6)
We note that, due to the particular form of the evolution equations for the aspiration levels, the stationary points of (1), (4)
and (5) can be determined by solving the single algebraic equation
F(µ,ΠC (µ),ΠD(µ)) = 0 (7)
in the interval (0, 1), with F defined in (1).
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Fig. 1. Cooperation levels, T = 2, R = 1.
3. Results
We choose the following two-parameters normalized payoff matrix for the basic 2-person PD game, with T = 2 > R >
P ≥ 0:
C D
C R 0
D 2 P
Weperformed calculations for different payoffs R, P , and two families of the switch functions f , for various numerical values
of the parameters (l, v), and d, determining these families respectively:
f1(χ) =

0, χ ≤ 0
χ l
v + χ l , χ > 0.
(8)
f2(χ) =
{
0, χ ≤ 0
th(qχ), χ > 0. (9)
In all the considered cases (7) has a unique solution µ∗ ∈ (0.1), which determines the stable equilibrium point (α∗C =
ΠC (µ
∗), α∗D = ΠD(µ∗)) in the phase plane of the system (1), (4) and (5).
For comparison we also performed calculations of the asymptotic cooperation level for the model with one global
aspiration level α, which evolves in time according to the equation α˙ = Π(µ) − α, where Π = µΠC + (1 − µ)ΠD is
the mean payoff of a randomly chosen player. In this case in (1) αC = αD = α, and (7) takes the form F(µ,Π(µ)) = 0.
In Fig. 1 we show the dependence of the asymptotic partial cooperation level µ∗ on the punishment payoff P , with the
reward R = 1, for the model with two aspiration levels and for the model with one aspiration. For the switch function f1 we
present the plots for v = 1, l = 1, for f2 we choose q = 1. As one can see by inspection, for the model with two aspiration
functions the cooperation level is always greater than half, whereas for the model with one global aspiration, it is always
below that value.
Another interesting observation supports better performance of the systems with two aspiration levels. As can be seen
from Fig. 1, for systems with one aspiration, for large enough payoffs P (≈0.78 for f1, ≈0.7 for f2) the asymptotic partial
cooperation levelµ∗ does not exist—the only outcome is total defection, whereas for systemswith two aspirationsµ∗ exists
for all P ∈ [0, 1], i.e. for all values consistent with the definition of PD game. Moreover, the asymptotic partial cooperation
is greater than half, and approaches 12 in the limiting case P −→ R = 1.
In Fig. 2 we present the asymptotic cooperation level for fixed P = 0.5, varying the reward parameter R in the interval
[0.5, 2] (therefore again preserving the essence of the PD game), with the same parameters of the switch functions f1, f2 as in
Fig. 1. Similarly to the previous case discussed in Fig. 1, we note better performance of the systemswith two aspiration levels,
although in the case of two aspirations the cooperation level decreases with increasing R. Similar behavior was observed for
the other switch functions, and for other values of the payoffs P and T .
In order to understand the last effect we consider below the switch function
f3(χ) =
{0, χ ≤ 0
pχ, 0 < χ ≤ 1/p,
1, χ > 1/p,
(10)
for which the rigorous explanation can be provided. In particular we prove
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Fig. 2. Cooperation levels, T = 2, P = 0.5.
Theorem. For the PD payoffs [T , R, P, 0], satisfying (T − P)(R− 1) ≤ R and (T − P)2 ≤ T − P + R,
µ∗ = 1
1+ RT−P
(11)
is the partial cooperation level for the system (1), (4) and (5) with the switch function f3 with the steepness p = 1.
Thus, µ∗ decreases for increasing R, P , and for decreasing T . In particular, the result holds for the payoffs in Fig. 2, with
µ∗ = 33+2R .
Proof. In equilibrium Eqs. (4) and (5) give αC = µR, αD = µ(T − P)+ P, and (7) takes the form
− µ2f3(αC − R)+ µ(1− µ)[f3(αD − T )− f3(αC )] + (1− µ)2f3(αD − P) = 0. (12)
Due to the inequalities αC < R, and αD < T , (12) simplifies to
− µf3(αC )+ (1− µ)f3(αD − P) = 0. (13)
Since αC > 0 and αD > P , in (13) either f3(X) = X or f3(X) = 1. Thus, (13) can have four different forms. In particular, for
f3(αC ) = αC , f3(αD − P) = αD − P , (13) takes the form−µ2R+ µ(1− µ)(T − P) = 0,which has the nonzero solution µ∗
given by (11). The proof ends by verification that the arguments of f3 in (13) satisfy, withµ = µ∗, the consistency conditions:
αC ≤ 1, and αD − P ≤ 1, equivalent to two inequalities in the statement of the Theorem. 
The remaining three forms of (13) give other partial cooperation levels under different assumptions on the payoffs,
cf. Appendix.
For comparison we also calculated the partial cooperation level for the payoffs in Fig. 2 for the model with one global
aspiration function α, and the switch function f3 with p = 1. It turns out that in this case µ∗ is the relevant solution of the
equation 2µ2(3 − 2R) + µ(2R − 7) + 1 = 0, and, as in Fig. 2, is an increasing function of R for R ∈ [0.5, 2].We omit the
details.
We also performed extensive calculations for other parameters determining the switch functions f1, f2, for other switch
functions, and other PD payoffs (in particular for the payoffs T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0, used in the Axelrod’s [18]
tournament), with the same qualitative conclusions of better performance of the systems with two strategy-dependent
aspiration levels.
4. Discussion
We presented a generalization of a model of cooperation in the system of agents playing the PD game, and possessing
two, strategy-dependent aspirations. Contrary to the model with one global aspiration function, our model has in general
greater than half the asymptotic cooperation level for a large spectrum of the parameters of the model.
The analytical form of the temporal evolution of the adaptation of the aspiration levels is one of the key ingredients of the
model. In this respect we note that the discrete version of (4) and (5) (written as Euler’s finite difference scheme) is similar
to the updating rule considered in [12]. The authors assumed that the aspiration level adapts to recent payoff pi according to
the equation At+1 = (1−h)At+hpi , where the parameter h (habituation)measures the speedwithwhich the aspiration level
floats toward the global payoff. In the cited paper the aspiration level provided the benchmark for evaluation of the payoffs,
which was next applied to update the probability of action (strategy) choices. In our model the aspiration functions are used
in the equation for the evolution of the partial cooperation, which is the probability of playing the cooperative strategy by
a randomly chosen player. If our system of differential equations were to be solved numerically, small time increment of
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the relevant numerical scheme would correspond to small habituation, i.e. to small speed of adaptation of the aspiration
functions in the infinite systems of agents.
There are several interesting open problemswhich are left for future research. In our model the agents which use a given
strategy are nondistinguishable. An interesting research project is to study agent-based heterogeneous models of cooper-
ation, in which the agents could have individual aspiration functions. A cellular automata approach could be the adequate
framework in this respect. It may be also of interest to study the effects of introducing various aspiration levels in agent-
basedmodels of reinforced learning of the Bush–Mosteller type [12]. Analysis of properties of both types ofmodels could give
more insight into the explanation of the cooperative behavior in the microscopic aspiration-based models of cooperation.
In the consideredmodel the introduction of aspiration functions allows us to obtain a partial cooperation in the system of
agents playing the PD game. Recently it has been established that the introduction of spatial structure with local interaction
rules in the systems of agents playing the PD also promotes cooperation. It may be of interest to investigate the influence
of various types of aspiration update rules on the evolution of cooperation in the continuous systems of agents facing other
types of social dilemmas, e.g. the snow-drift game, cf. e.g. [9], for which the partial cooperation is grantedwithout additional
learning mechanisms.
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Appendix
Eq. (13) give the following partial cooperation levels for the system (1), (4) and (5) with the switch function f3 with the
steepness p = 1:
1. For (T − P)(R− 1) ≤ R and (T − P)2 ≤ T − P + R, the cooperation level µ∗ = 1
1+ RT−P
.
2. For R > 2 and T − P ≥ 2, µ∗ = 12 .
3. For (T − P)(R− 1) ≥ R and T − P < 2, µ∗ = 1− 1T−P .
4. For R ≤ 2 and (T − P)2 > R+ T − P , µ∗ = −1+
√
(1+4R)
2R .
Note that in all the four cases the sufficient conditions for the relevant cooperation levels are combinations of two
parameters only: R, andW .= T−P . Thus, the two-dimensional phase space of the payoff parameters (R,W ) decomposes in
four domains 1–4 defined above. The cooperation level changes continuously through the lines separating the domains. In
the domains 1 and 4µ∗ decreases with increasing R, whereas in the domains 2 and 3 the cooperation level does not depend
on R. In the domains 1 and 3µ∗ increases withW (i.e. in particular if P decreases or if T increases). On the other hand in the
domains 2 and 4 µ∗ does not depend onW . Thus, the qualitative properties of the asymptotic cooperation level are quite
sensitive with respect to the PD payoffs in the considered aspiration-based mean field model.
Analogous theorems could be proved for f3 with general p, and for other switch functions, e.g. for f1, and for the Heaviside
switch function
f0(χ) =
{
0, χ ≤ 0,
1, χ > 0, (14)
for which the solutions of (7) can be found as zeros of the relevant polynomials.
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